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When I was sixteen, my mother gave me a lesson in consumer crediL
She tossed a flurry of "introductory offer" mailers from credit card compa-
nies on the table and told me to find the "best deal." I compared one card,
which offered a rate of 2.9% for the first three months, 8.9% for the next six
months, and a final permanent rate of 18% with a card having a rate of 6.9%
for the first six months before increasing to a permanent rate of 18%. Strug-
gling with this nightmarish word problem, I somehow managed to persevere
and choose the first offer.'
People sift through the offers in the mail, on TV, and on the web strug-
gling to get the best deal without ever knowing that before 1968, this was an
impossibility.2 Today, the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) governs consumer
credit by ensuring consumers are given the information needed to make in-
formed decisions.'
This article analyzes the impact of the courts' ever increasing priority to
enforce arbitration agreements in TILA claims and reform. Part I entails a
general discussion of TILA's logistics; the goals, the means, and the reme-
dies 4 Part II briefly traces the rise of arbitration as well as evaluating its vari-
* Bachelor of Arts, University of California, Los Angeles. Juris Doctor candidate 2002.
Pepperdine School of Law. The author thanks her family and Mr. Paul K. Adams for their
continued support.
1. I reasoned both credit cards have the same final interest rate, so the "best deal" is
whichever card that has a reduced rate for the longest period of time. The first offer has a re-
duced rate for nine months making it the best deal.
Of course, I could have just used imaginary balances. If both cards had initial balances of
one-thousand dollars, I could have applied the interest rates to determine which amount would be
lower. Apparently this method was too direct for me, but my dad told me I was right anyway.
2. See infra note 16.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 9-56 and accompanying text.
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ous advantages and disadvantages. 5 Part III reports on the current emphasis of
enforcing arbitration agreements in federal courts by explaining the basis of
enforcing the agreement. 6 Part IV explores the impact of arbitrating TILA
claims on the claim and on individuals. 7 Part V provides an analysis of class
actions under TILA and examines the impact of enforcing arbitration agree-
ments on class action procedure.8
I. TLA
Quiz Show ended in scandal, Camelot was long since gone, and business
was booming. After World War II, the United States experienced Promethean
economic growth and with it came a new phenomenon in consumer transac-
tions: a large availability of consumer credit.9 With this availability came
scurrilous interest rates that were neither standard nor accurate.' 0 The first
consumer credit-cost disclosure bill was introduced in 1960 by Senator Paul
Douglas of Illinois, but it was a long, eight year wait for federal legislation."
President Johnson in his message on consumer protection lauded credit
2
while also praising the aims of TILA.' 3 In response Congress enacted TLA
through the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA)' 4 in 1968 to level the
5. See infra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 109-123 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 124-157 and accompanying text.
9. At the time of TILA's passage, the interest cost of consumer credit amounted to $13 bil-
lion. H.R. REP. No. 90-1040 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965.
As of 1998, outstanding consumer credit amounted to $350 billion; assuming an interest rate
of 16% this creates a cost of $52 billion. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ADSntACt OF THE,
UNrIED STATES no. 824 (119 ed. 1999).
10. There is much debate to this point. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11. FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT [ 1.02 (Peter T. Mangione et al. eds.,
1981) [hereinafter MANGIONE].
12. President Johnson said about credit:
Consumer credit has become an essential feature of the American way of life. It permits
families with secure and growing incomes to plan ahead and to enjoy fully and promptly
the ownership of automobiles and modern household appliances. It finances higher educa-
tion for many who could not otherwise afford it. To families struck by serious illness or
other financial setbacks, the opportunity to borrow eases the burden by spreading the pay-
ments over time.
H.R. REP. No. 90-1040 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965.
13. President Johnson said, "I recommend legislation to assure-full and accurate informa-
tion to the borrower, and simple and routine calculations for the lender. This legislation is ur-
gently needed to close an important gap in consumer information [and] protect legitimate lenders
against competitors who misrepresent credit costs." Id.
14. The CCPA includes TILA (Title I, Chapters 1-3), the Fair Credit Billing Act (the
FCBA is Title I, Chapter 4), the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 (this Act is Title I, Chapter 5),
2
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playing field between consumers and creditors as well as to foster competi-
tion among creditors.' 5
Congress drafted TILA to protect consumers from unfair credit prac-
tices16 and to enhance economic stabilization17 by ensuring consumers' in-
formed use of credit.' Congress rationalized knowing the cost of a loan, pro-
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the FCRA is Title VI), the Equal Opportunity Act (the EOA is Ti-
tle VII), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the FDCPA is Title VIII). and the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act (the EFTA is Title IX). MICiAEL HALES. HANDBooK oF Co.UmER BAhuoNw
LAW 3 (1989).
15. Cathleen M. Combs, Class Action Developments, 989 P.L Co. L & PRAr_ COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 189, 201 (1997).
16. By promoting the informed use of credit, consumers would be protected. 15 US.C. §
1601 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2000). Whether or not consumers were being railroaded by
credit companies prior to TILA is at issue. In Mourning it Family Publication Services. the Su-
preme Court clearly states that consumers were "ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations
and of the costs of deferring payment." 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973) (attributing this ignorance to
sometimes fraudulent practices by creditors). Senator Paul Douglas, Chairman of the National
Commission on Urban Affairs, argued the following in support of TILA:
It is only in the field of consumer credit that confusion and obfuscation prevail. Here bor-
rowers are being forced to pay interest on amounts which they have already repaid. They
are not told this, however. In fact, this is carefully concealed from them.
When the consumer is faced with this jumble of rate methods and complicated financial
terms, it is no wonder that he throws up his hands and asks merely to see the size of the
monthly payments. For unless he is a skilled mathematician, he will be utterly confused
and thoroughly misled if he attempts to compare rates quoted by various lenders.
Hearing on S.5 before the Subcomm. On Fin. Instit. of the S. Comm. On Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 41 (1969).
But some argue the plethora of state laws adequately protected the consumer, thus there was
no need for federal legislation. Nathaniel E. Butler, Truth and Confusion in Lending, reprinted in
LIVING wITH TRUTH IN LENDING AD DiscLosum LEmst.AToN . . . A PRAcnCAL ApPROACH. 103-
07, at 103 (James J. Egan, Jr. et al. eds., 1969); Elwin Griffith, Recent Developments in the Ef-
fort to Simplify Truth In Lending, 19 TULSA L.. 30 (1983).
In response, creditors had no uniform way to calculate interest, thus a lower interest rate
may actually result in a more expensive loan. EluZan-m RENUART & KATmLW4 E. KEssr. NA-
TIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER. TRUTH IN LENDING 33-34 (4th ed. 1999) (providing excellent ex-
amples to illustrate this point). Additionally, a 1964 survey shows that consumers were not aware
of the true cost of a loan. Id. at 33 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1040, reprinted in 1968 U.SS.C.A.N.
1962, 1970).
17. The concept is to regulate, not by tampering with market mechanisms, but to improve
conditions under which the market operates. JOHN R. FosEcA. HANDUNO CoNsuuER CRurr
CAsEs § 8.1, 299 (1986). It follows, a credit provider may charge whatever interest rate it
desires, but it may not conceal that rate.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2001).
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vided by mandatory material disclosures, 9 equated informed choices about a
loan.20 Because this statute is very much in favor of aiding unsophisticated
consumers, 21 TILA is strictly limited to consumer credit transactions, 22 and
limits necessary disclosures to those that are material and germane.23 Along
with enacting TILA, Congress granted authority to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to create regulations to implement TILA. 24
The FRB, in turn, created Regulation Z25 to govern TILA.26 Regulation Z pro-
vides statutory interpretations that protect both consumers and creditors. 27
TILA works for a variety of reasons. Early theories explain that TILA
provides unsophisticated debtors with legal leverage in defending against
creditors.2 8 There is also a widespread belief that by promulgating a theory of
strict liability, TILA creates near absolute compliance because even a failure
to comply with a technicality results in a violation.29 In recent years, Con-
19. The following are currently considered material facts to disclose: (a) the true cost in
terms of an interest rate and dollar amount; (b) any finance charges; (c) the amount financed; (d)
total payments; and (e) payment schedule. 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (u). For a detailed analysis of calcu-
lating the above numbers, please refer to HALES, supra note 14, at 28-55.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
21. The following all cite TILA's goals as "to aid the unsophisticated consumer" so that
he would not be easily misled as to the cost of financing. Tomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619
F.2d 246, 248 (3rd Cir. 1980); Shepeard v. Quality Siding & Window Factory, Inc., 73 F. Supp.
1295, 1299 (D. Del. 1990); Morris v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 708 F Supp. 1198, 1203 (D. Kan.
1989); Goldberg v. Delaware Olds, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. Del. 1987).
Some studies have shown that TILA has been ineffective in educating "high risk" consum-
ers about the cost of credit. FONSECA, supra note 17, at § 8.1, 296 (referencing Nat'l Comm. on
Consumer Fin., Consumer Credit in the U.S. 179 (1972)).
22. Congress sets forth certain exempted transactions without listing exactly what TILA
encompasses. 15 U.S.C. § 1603. Specific limitations to TILA's application include (a) the trans-
action must include a consumer, (b) creditors must extend credit regularly; (c) the transaction
must be payable in more than four transactions; and (d) the loan must be less than $25,000 un-
less secured by real property. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (listing the first three limitations);
12 C.F.R. § 226.3(b) (discussing the fourth limitation). See also HAtms, supra note 14, at 15 fig.
2.1 (1989) (illustrating a detailed analysis to determine if TILA applies to the situation).
23. Because transactions differ, each agreement need not contain the same information. For
example, an agreement to purchase a car must include the total number of payments while an
agreement for a credit card has no finite number of payments, thus this "material fact" is inap-
plicable. HALEs, supra note 14, at 16-18.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
25. 12 C.FR. § 226. All FRB regulations are in the 200 series of volume 12 of the code
of Federal Regulations. The letter a regulation is assigned corresponds numerically to its place in
the register, e.g. Regulation B can be found at 12 C.F.R. § 202. Accordingly, Regulation Z is
found at 12 C.F.R. § 226.
26. Mourning v. Family Publ'n Servs, 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1.
28. FONSECA, supra note 17, at § 8.1, 297.
29. Werts v. Fed. Nat'l Mort. Assoc., 48 B.R. 980 (1985)(saying "[t]here is no such thing
4
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gress amended TILA to put creditors "in a better position to know whether a
consumer may properly rescind a transaction" 3 and to eliminate TILA's lev-
erage function. 3' While this language seems mild, it illustrates a definite shift
in Congress' attitude towards TILA's goals; the consumer no longer reigns su-
preme in a TILA transaction.3 2 This transition started in 1980 when Congress
passed the Truth In Lending Simplification and Reform Act,33 which had two
main goals, to strengthen the agencies' authority over creditors34 and to sim-
plify disclosures 3 5 Regardless, TILA is an effective mechanism.
as substantial compliance with the Truth in Lending Act, either you are or you aren't"): Mason
v. General Fm. Co., 542 F.2d 1226, 1233 (4th Cir. 1976)(holding use of term "Contract Rate" is
incompatible with the mandatory terminology "Finance Charges" and "Annual Percentage
Rate"); Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding failure
to use the term "new balance" is a violation of the Act).
30. John Roddy, Reversing Field" Is There a Trend Toward Abrogating Truth In Lending?,
772 PLL CoM. L & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIEs 643 (1998); S. Rep. No. 368, 29, re-
printed in 190 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264.
31. FONSECA, supra note 17, at § 8.1, 297.
32. TILA was first amended in 1980. This amendment reduced the sting of TILA reme-
dies, but preserved the original goals. The 1995 amendments, however, gutted the goals one au-
thor likening it to "having most of its teeth extracted." Roddy, supra note 30, at 639 (1998).
Perhaps this is because in the past ten years, TILA disclosures have resulted in greater con-
sumer knowledge. The FRB found an almost 200% increase in consumer awareness of prevailing
APRs. FRB, Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 20.941 at 10.943 (quot-
ing an agency study that in 1969 less than 15% of consumers were aware of prevailing APRs
and in 1977 almost 55% were familiar with the numbers). Congress certainly attributed this in-
crease to the Act's effects on competition. S. Rep. No. 368. reprinted in 180 U.S.S.C.A.N. 236,
252.
33. Most amendments of the Simplification and Reform Act were enacted on October 1,
1982; the law, however, was passed on March 31. 1980. Pub. L No. 96-221, as amended Pub.
L. No. 97-110.
34. FONsECA, supra note 17, at § 8.1, 299. See DEMtS RYLANsKY. TRuti-t.LENDtNo AN)
REGULATION Z A PRACnCAL GuIDE To CLosED-END CDTrr 14-47 (1984)(providing an in depth
discussion of TILA's coverage).
35. One major complaint of TILA prior to 1980 was the disclosure forms were too long
for consumers to understand. REPLANSKY, supra note 33, at 7.
In response the amendment had four substantial changes as follows: (I) decrease the amount
of information that must be revealed to the consumer, (2) decreased creditor liability for statutory
remedies; (3) authorized model disclosure forms to limit civil liability; and (4) strengthened ad-
ministrative enforcement. Id. at 6-7.
At the behest of Congress, the FRB created model disclosure forms; use of these forms is
compliance with TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b). Obviously this presumption does not extend to the
numerical entries provided in each transaction. Besides looking to those listed in Regulation Z.
there are myriad publications that compile examples of complying documents. See. e.g.. ALVIN L
ARNOLD. TRUTH-IN-LENDING AND FAIR CREDIT REPoRTING Fots GuE (1971) CARL FmEN-
5
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Enforcement of TILA is through a combination of administrative ac-
tions,3 criminal prosecution,37 and private litigation. 38 Because so many credit
agencies were already regulated by agencies, Congress fragmented the admin-
istrative enforcement of TILA by distributing control among nine different
agencies. 39 Primarily, however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) governs
TILA when not otherwise specifically enumerated in the statute ° Criminal
sanctions, which are rarely charged, apply only if the creditor willfully and
knowingly violates the act.4'
As for private litigation, consumers act as their own "private attorney
general"' 42 seeking three types of damages, actual damages, statutory dam-
ages, and attorney's fees. 43 A claim of actual damages, to which there is no
cap, may be recovered for any violation assuming the plaintiff can show ac-
tual injury.44 Statutory damages, applying in both open-end45 and close-end 46
credit transactions, are awarded if the consumer was given incorrect informa-
tion, regardless of whether the transaction was minor or there were no dam-
ages. 47 In open-end transactions, statutory damages may be imposed for inad-
equate initial disclosure or periodic statements. 48 In close-end transactions,
statutory damages may be awarded if the credit company fails to disclose the
amount financed, the finance charge, the annual percentage rate, the number
FELD & ALAN SIEGEL. SIMPuFID CONSUMER CREDIT FORMS (Cum. Supp. 1986).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1607.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1611.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1).
Recission is another valuable remedy, which applies in transaction dealing with the purchase
of a house. This is a complex and ever changing area of TILA into which I will not delve. While
this Act is primarily about disclosure, rescission is one of the few areas of substantive consumer
protection. In a transaction involving the creditor receiving a security interest in the consumer's
home, consumers were given the right to rescind the contract within three days of proper disclo-
sure. For an explanation of this remedy, consult RENUART & KEas, supra note 16, at 337-413.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c).
41. Indeed, this sanction is quite rare because it is difficult to prove. The penalty is a fine
not to exceed $5,000 or an imprisonment not to exceed I year or both. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1998).
42. REPLANSKY, supra note 34, at 231.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1690(The Simplification Act clarified the attorney's fees allowed).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1). Damages are computed by the excess interest charged.
45. Open-end credit is ongoing or revolving credit. HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F.
CHASE. CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 285 (1986).
46. Close-end credit refers to one-time credit purchases, such as financing a car. Id.
47. Statutory damages for individuals are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A).
48. Id. Prior to the 1980 amendment, any instance of non-compliance resulted in statutory
damages, even if the fact was non-material. See In re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1984)
(failing to list consumer's residence would have resulted in statutory damages had the statute of
limitations not run). Today the non-compliance must be material. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A).
6
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of payments, the payment schedule, or the security interest schedule.49 Statu-
tory damages are equal to twice the amount of any finance charge involved in
the transaction and have a $200 minimum with a $2000 maximum st
Defenses to a alleged TILA violation have multiplied since its inception.
Of course, the statute of limitation is an adequate defense to TILA actions,
unless the creditor initiates a suit against the consumer, wherein the consumer
is not barred from asserting a violation.5' Originally, a creditor's act done in
good faith conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation of TILA and
Regulation Z was an adequate defense to a TILA violationYn The Simplifica-
tion Act; however, created model forms to facilitate compliance making good
faith claims harder to prove if not using the model forms.3 Prompt correction
is also a defense; if within 60 days of discovering the faulty disclosure, the
consumer is notified and adjustments are made, then a TILA action does not
lie. 4 A harder defense to employ is that of bona fide error, which applies
only to the most technical errors.-s While Congress has loosened the teeth of
TILA,-s it has restricted the possible defenses to maintain its effectiveness.
II. ARBITRATION
Arbitration is a dispute resolution process where a neutral third party
renders a decision after each party has stated his case. While this process has
only gained great attention in the past 20 years, there is a long history of ar-
bitration throughout the world from both the Phoenician and Greek traders to
early North American merchants.s7 Even President Lincoln lauded alternatives
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A).
50. Id.
51. The statute of limitations is one year from the date of the violation. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(e).
52. FONSECA, supra note 17, at § 8.9, 327.
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b). Some courts have restricted the discovery of error to mathemati-
cal and clerical errors only. E.g. Hamilton v. Southern Discount Com., 656 F.2d 150. n.62 (5th
Cir. 1981).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c). The company must, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove
the violation was not intentional, notwithstanding the maintenance of reasonable procedures
adapted to avoid the error. Mirable v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1976), overruled on other grounds Brown v. Marquette Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 686 F.2d 603 (7th
Cir. 1982).
56. See supra note 32.
57. BE'rm J. RoTH Er.AL. THE ALTERNATIe Dmstre RmEsowoN PRAc'ncE GumE § 1.1, 2
269
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to litigation:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point
out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of
time. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There
will still be business enough..8
In addition to its long history, arbitration provides many advantages to
traditional resolution in courts. The process of arbitration is quickly initiated
and with relaxed rules of evidence, arbitration eases the difficulties of suing a
party represented by a large firm.59 Additionally, arbitrators with special ex-
pertise may be found for a particularly complex case, thus providing a resolu-
tion that best suits both parties' needs.6° Because of arbitration's de-emphasis
on perpetuating the adversarial system, antagonization between the parties de-
creases. 61 The privacy of the decision is also of great benefit to companies. 62
Of course, arbitration is significantly cheaper; there may be more direct costs,
but overall fees are greatly reduced. 63 Even the company benefits in a TILA
(1993).
58. THE CouECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Vol II, 81-2 (Roy P. Basler, et al., ed.
1953-55).
59. A party is able to quickly move towards resolution, instead of waiting for an opening
in the dockets. National Institute for Dispute Resolution, Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy
Issues of Dispute Resolution at 13 (1983)[hereinafter Paths to Justice], reprinted in Administra-
tive Conference of the U.S., Sourcebook: Fed. Agency Use of Alt. Means of Disp. Res. at 21
(Office of the Chairman; 1987)[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
60. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 10, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 59, at 18;
Jean R. Sternlight. As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Ac-
tion Survive, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 22 (2000)[hereinafter Stemlight, Mandatory].
61. Laurie A. Rich & Kenneth Jacobson, Alternative Dispute Resolution-Opening Doors to
Settlements-, CHEMICAL WEEK, August 14, 1985, at 29, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK. supra note 59,
at 72. This is most often seen in cases involving two business. For example, in a case involving
breach of contract for failing to deliver goods to a retailer, courtroom based litigation almost as-
sures that the parties will not work together in the future. In an arbitration situation, however, the
situation is not as adversarial, thus possibly saving the relationship. Joseph T. McLaughlin,
Resolving Disputes in the Financial Community: Alternatives to Litigation, 41 ARB. J. 16, 21
(1986).
62. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 10, 13, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 59, at
18, 21. A company is not tarnished by accusations, or even findings, as it would in a trial. Hugh
R. Jones, Arbitration from the Viewpoint of the Practicing Attorney: An Analysis of Arbitration
Cases Decided by the New York State Court of Appeals From January, 1973 to September, 1985,
14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 523, 526 (1986) (praising virtue of privacy as to fact of controversy and
result).
63. Arbitration is less expensive because of relaxed evidentiary standards; the costs associ-
ated with document authentication and production of a record is nil in arbitration. ROBERT F.
MILLMAN,. ARBrrRATION 2 (1981); RoTH, supra note 56, at § 3.5. Contra DONNA STIENSTR &
THOMAS E. WILLGING, ALTERNATIvES TO LMGATION: Do THEY HAVE A PLACE IN THE FEDERAL
DisTRICr COuRTS? 25 (1995) (arguing these claims are unsubstantiated).
8
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class action; if the lender loses, it has only legal bill for one case. Most im-
portantly, arbitration seems to empower individuals more, perhaps because an
individual is more likely to defeat a corporation in arbitration than in a court-
room setting.65 There is also a general feeling of goodwill the public has
about arbitration; people like it& and believe it is fair.67
Even with these advantages, disadvantages always exist. The largest con-
cern with arbitration is that it creates a dearth of precedent leaving many fun-
damental issues of law unsettled.68 Additionally, this can allow parties to hide
While the following studies have small sample sizes, it is adequate proof that arbitration is
cheaper. In one United States District Court, there was a 20% decrease in the cost of a case,
even after there was some litigation prior to the cases being seat to arbitration. Id. at 29 (citing
ALLEN LIDm, ARBn'RATmG HIGH STAKES CASES: AN EVALA'tO OF COURT AhNExED ARBIrRA.
TION IN ONE UNnED STATES DImicrT COURT, 39-41 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1990)). An-
other survey of those who had participated in court ordered arbitration after initial appearances in
court, showed there was approximately a $6,000 difference between litigation and arbitration.
BARBARA S. MEumRoEE. CoURT-ANNExE ARnn.AoN iN TEN Dtmcr COURTS 85 (1990). Ad-
ditionally, the attorneys in these cases felt that they had saved time (60% agreed) and that the
cost was less (62% agreed) because of the arbitration. Id.
Realize the cost can be decreased even more when the parties go directly to arbitration be-
cause of contractual arbitration agreements. This allows a much needed improvement in access to
legal remedies. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 8, reprinted in Sourcebook. supra note 59, a
16 (estimating 1% of the United States receives 95% of all legal services provided).
64. See Charles T. DuMars & Marilyn C. O'Leary, Class Action Damages Under The
Truth In Lending Act: The Consumer Perspective, 58 U. Det. J. Urb. L 699, 705 (1981). TILA
allows the prevailing consumer to collect attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a).
65. Corporations win 83% of the time in suits against individuals and only 63% of the
time in arbitration proceedings against individuals. Sarah Baxter, Appeals from Arbitration Orders
Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Pro-arbitration Policy Clashes With The Right to Appeal Fi-
nal Decisions, 2000 J. Dws. REoL 165 (2000).
66. 59% of Americans would automatically chose arbitration over litigation. And once in-
formed of the cost of litigation, the percentage of approval jumps 24% to 83% in favor of arbi-
tration. Roper Poll Reveals Americans, Preference for Resolving Legal Issues; Majority Believe
Arbitration is Their Best Option, PR NEwswum Nov 15. 1999, available at The National Arbi-
tration Forum's web site (visited February 16, 2002) <http://www.arb-forum.cornaboutlques-
tions.asp#23>). Contra SwiENsnsA & WaLGiNG, supra note 63, at 23 (arguing that public satisfac-
tion does not warrant doing away with precedent).
67. Of a study of ten pilot court ordered arbitration programs, which included 6248 cases,
80% of the parties involved in the arbitration thought the proceedings were fair, 92% of the at-
torneys thought the proceedings were fair. MEmRHoEER. supra note 63. at 63 (1990).
68. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 10, 13, reprinted in Sourccbook. supra note 59, at
18, 21; JERoLD S. AUERBACH. JusncE WrmouT LAw? 113 (1983) (discussing complaint that
"[dlominant business interests ... would use compulsory arbitration clauses as a shield for their
efforts to control prices, suppress competition, and thwart legislative regulation while they re-
moved their private rules from public supervision")(emphasis added).
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their actions from public scrutiny, which may result in other companies not
taking preventative measures. 69 Also with severely limited discovery, there is
little chance to crystallize the issues causing disputants to make decisions
about which they are not fully informed. 0
As to the cost, there is no argument that litigation is expensive, but in
many cases, the precedential value is worth the cost.71 Up front costs of arbi-
tration deter many consumers from proceeding with arbitration.72 Some law-
yers are unwilling to take these binding arbitration cases on contingency, so
even when a consumer can afford the arbitration fees, his case may still be
thwarted by his inability to fund a retainer.73 First USA, which adopted arbi-
tration in 1977, maintains that it is beneficial to both consumers and corpora-
tions because arbitration is cheaper, thus allowing more claims to be
brought. 74 Contrary to the official corporate statement, arbitration is used
more by companies than consumers; of the more than 50,000 claims concern-
ing First USA, all but four of the complaints were made by the corporation. 75
These advantages and disadvantages have been widely criticized, but there
has been a gradual acceptance of arbitration in both the legislature and
judiciary.
69. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at T.3, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 59, at 21,
41. If a decision is private, there is no possibility for reprimands from the community.
The privacy of a decision also affects other corporations actions. If one corporation is liable,
most corporations change their policy to comply. If the decision is private, corporations will re-
main static. Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institu.
tions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL 267, 312-13
(1995).
70. Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 11, 15, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 59, at
19, 23.
71. Arbitration is not necessarily corrective, i.e. if the problem is not fixed, more people
must sue for the correction to become economically viable to the corporation. Accordingly, the
corporation does an analysis of how many people it thinks will sue and because arbitration is
"cheaper" there must be more people to sue who to make correction economically viable.
72. The International Chamber of Commerce requires a fee of $4,000 for claims that in-
volve less than $50,000. The National Arbitration Forum charges $49 for claims that have less
than $1000 in dispute and $149 for claims that have less than $15,000 in dispute. Caroline E.
Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print. 'You Can't Sue Us;' Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers From
Taking Companies to Court WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Mayer, Hidden];
Paths to Justice, supra note 59, at 15, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 59, at 23.
73. Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al. This is especially true in TILA claims, when the
dispute only concerns a $29 late fee. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. First USA began mandatory arbitration in 1997. It wins approximately 99.6% of the
time. Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?; Arbitration Forum's Rulings Called One-
Sided, WASH. POST, March 1, 2000, at El [hereinafter Mayer, Win]. Of the 51,622 claims against
consumers, the forum has made 19,075 awards, only 87 of those were in favor of consumers
(3,600 cases were still pending at the time of publication of the Mayer article). Id.
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This gradual acceptance originated with private organizations. The for-
mation of the Arbitration Society of America 76 in 1922 was the driving force
behind the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925." The FAA
is a dramatic piece of legislation enforcing arbitration agreements in both
maritime transactions and in contracts involving commerce. 8 The Act is used
solely to enforce the terms of arbitration agreements.9 The passage of the
FAA spurred state support for the enforcement of arbitration agreements; all
50 states now have some arbitration enforcement provision enacted.P What
started as a small policy groups has created a nationwide preference for
arbitration.
It is seemingly impossible to identify exactly how many companies use
arbitration agreements in everyday contracts, but the number has multiplied
76. Rout, supra note 57, at 3. This organization later merged with the Arbitration Forum
in 1926 to form the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Id.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The FAA's passage was motivated by congressional desire to en-
force arbitration agreements to arbitrate and overrule the court's longstanding refusal to enforce
these agreements. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468. This distrust of arbitration appar-
ently "lie[s] in 'ancient times,' when the English courts fought 'for extension of jurisdiction-all
of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every on of them of jurisdic-
tion.' " Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198. 211 (1956) (Frankfurter J. concur-
ring) (quoting United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.. 222 F. 1006. 1007
(SDNY 1915)).
While the FAA is a federal law, it does not provide federal jurisdiction, accordingly the
FAA only applies in cases that have independent subject matter jurisdiction. SJ. Groves & Sons
v. Am. Arb. Assoc., 452 F. Supp. 121 (D. Minn. 1978) (dismissing the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the only possible federal claim was the arbitration agreement).
78. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
79. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The only exceptions ae those remedies grounded in equity or at
law for the revocation of a contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
While originally conceived to apply to disputes in federal courts, the FAA also applies in
state courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984)(holding that the FAA applies in state
as well as federal court, and that it preempts conflicting state statutes). Contra I1N R. McNEtL
AMERICAN ARBrrRA'nON LAw: REFo tnoN. NxnoNALzAoN. IN'ERNATIo.w"AnoON at 117 (ar-
guing "the hearings confirm what is already clear from the prior background and the bills them-
selves [the proposed USAA (the FAA)] was intended to apply only in federal courts").
80. Rout, supra note 57, at § 2.1, 2. 34 of these states have adopted the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act (UAA). These include Alaska. Arizona. Arkansas. Colorado. Delaware, Florida. Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa. Kansas, Kentucky. Maine, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan. Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada. New Mexico. North Carolina. North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina. South Dakota. Tennessee, Texas, Utah. Vermont. Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia has also adopted the UAA. Id. at § 2.2. 3.
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exponentially for credit companies.8' The next time you receive a credit card
solicitation, check the brochure for an arbitration agreement. If one is not
there, it will be when you are sent all the information. Having likened he in-
clusion of binding arbitration agreements to popcorn 2, one expects that "vir-
tually all major banks and lending institutions will implement consumer arbi-
tration procedures within the next five years [2003]." 83
III. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 84
After early resistance to ADR, courts have increasingly favored enforc-
ing arbitration agreements. 3 From the early 1980s, there have been thirteen
cases before the Supreme Court of the United States about contractual arbitra-
tion with all enforcing the agreements that evidenced a transaction involving
commerce.8 6 In fact, the high court states the goals of the FAA supersede all
81. See infra note 87.
82. "People who draft contracts have been including [mandatory arbitration provisions]
like popcorn." Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al (citing Edward Anderson, the Managing Di-
rector of the National Arbitration Forum).
83. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator? 7 Bus. L.
TODAY 24, 28 (1998).
84. For an extensive and almost assuredly exhaustive reference to federal cases dealing
with arbitration, please consult Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Pow-
ers, and Due Process Concerns 72 TUL L. REV. 1 (1997) [herinafter Stemlight, Rethinking].
85. The first court recognition of binding arbitration was in 1855. Burchell v. Marsh, 58
U.S. 344 (1854). Although a landmark case in arbitration's history, this case did not enforce the
arbitration agreement.
86. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1996) (reversing a Montana Su-
preme Court decision that refused to enforce an arbitration clause for failure to comply with
Montana's statutory notice requirement, and further holding that the statute was preempted by the
FAA); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding that the FAA
applies to the full extent of Congress' permitted regulation under the Commerce Clause); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion in holding that claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act may be re-
quired to be arbitrated); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989) (taking note of federal policy favoring arbitration in holding that federal securities fraud
claims may be required to be arbitrated); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (holding that securities fraud and RICO claims can be arbitrated, and stat-
ing that in light of federal favoritism toward arbitration, "[t]he burden is on the party opposing
arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) (stating that while "the parties' intentions control ... those intentions are gener-
ously construed as to issues of arbitrability."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984)
(holding that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court, and that it preempts conflicting
state statutes).
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other policy considerations, even when not judicially economical.8
Avoiding an arbitration provision is difficult. The FAA defines arbitra-
tion agreements as "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds exist at law or inequity for the revocation of any contract."88 Be-
cause an agreement to arbitrate any claims in the future is a contract, courts
use typical contract remedies to avoid the terms of these agreements, which
includes fraud and substantive unfaimess.8 There are extreme constraints on
the usage of these avoidance remedies; the questions against arbitrability must
be well supported by the evidence.9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled un-
less a party can show that "Congress itself has evinced an intention to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue" no rem-
edy will lie.91
Fraud, typically difficult to prove in contract disputes, is even more diffi-
cult when the contract provides for an arbitration proceeding. 92 Courts are not
willing to enforce arbitration agreements that have been induced by fraud"
While this seems quite simple, courts are very exacting when it comes to set-
ting a contract aside for fraud.94 The arbitration agreement is enforceable even
if the contract was induced by fraud. 95 The arbitration agreement will only be
87. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding a claim may be arbitrated
even if all pendent claims that supported the arbitration agreement are severed); see also Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
88. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
89. The FAA applicability to TILA claims is quite straightforward. As TILA is a federal
law, federal courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As such, the FAA mandates the
enforcement of arbitration agreements that concern TILA violations. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
90. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
91. Id at 628. As clarified in a later case, this intent may be found in the statute's text. its
legislative history, or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying purpose of the
statute. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Shearson/Ameican Express. Inc. v. McMahon. 482 U.S.
220, 227 (1987). However, all questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).).
92. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir 1988) (holding that
a reliance on an alleged misrepresentation is not reasonable where the party could, by reading the
contract, have ascertained the truth); Stemlight. Rethinking, supra note 83, at 31-32.
93. ROBERT M. RODMAN. CoMMERcIAL ARBrATo. § 5.1, 175 (1984); See Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manuf. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding the arbitrator decides if an
agreement is induced by fraud).
94. Prima Paint, 338 U.S. at 397.
95. Il
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set aside if the arbitration clause, itself, was induced by fraud. Specifically,
courts have enforced clauses when an agent states the signing is just a mere
formality96 or even when an agent falsely states that signing does not compro-
mise any rights. 97
If a contract is substantively unfair or unconscionable, the court may set
the agreement aside.98 A contract is unconscionable when enforcement of the
contract would create a gross miscarriage of justice.99 Very few recent cases
are claiming arbitration clauses unconscionable if it imposes an unreasonable
financial burden;'00 however, this last ditch effort is a nebulous concept that is
rarely found.'0' As an example of the court's reluctance, American Express
notified its customers of the change in its litigation procedures by inserting a
notice in the monthly statement. 02 The notice proclaims the consumer is
bound to arbitration if he uses the card after a certain date. 103
This is a perfect example of a contract of adhesion, yet courts rarely
look to principles of adhesion to set the contract aside because all commerce
as we know it would stop. Simply because a contract is adhesive does not
render it invalid.'04 Contracts of adhesion are enforceable unless: (1) the con-
tract or clause was not within the "reasonable expectations" of the weaker or
adhering party, or (2) the contract or clause is unduly oppressive, unconscion-
able, or against public policy.10 5 The strident federal policy in favor of arbitra-
tion makes a finding of unscionability because of adhesion unlikely.1' 6
Despite this view, California has considered one arbitration agreement an
unenforceable contract of adhesion.'07 In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., the
court denied a music group's form contract with a music promoter. The con-
tract was adhesive because most musical performers are members of the
96. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. DeFries, 1994 WL 455178, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
97. Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (upholding the
arbitration clause reasoning that "[a] party who signs an instrument is presumed to know its con-
tents" even though the broker had failed to inform the client of the ramifications).
98. Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 1999 229 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Arnold v.
United Companies Lending Corp.,51l S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998).
99. Knepp, 1999 229 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
100. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29-34.
101. Even when it is a state court that is not bound to the Supreme Court's elevated stan-
dards. Ex pane Napier, 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C.
388 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998; Roberson v. Money Tree of Ala., 954 F. Supp. 1519 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
102. Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al.
103. Id.
104. Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, 961 F.2d. 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992).
105. Finkle & Ross v. Becker Paribas, 622 F.Supp. 1505, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
106. Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (1984); Fustok v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
107. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (1981).
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union, and anyone wishing to promote a concert with a union member must
sign the contract.'0 8 This view is decidedly without many supporters in federal
courts; most cases hold there is nothing inherently unfair or oppressive about
arbitration clausest) 9 Binding arbitration agreements, even those no one actu-
ally signs, are enforced without a second of thought.
IV. IMPACTS
Very few cases have ruled on whether TILA precludes arbitration of dis-
putes arising under the Act." 0 The court in Sagal v. First USA Bank refused
to elicit an exception to the FAA for TILA claims."' Regardless, lenders are
feverently using mandatory arbitration clauses." 2 As the downside of arbitrat-
ing TILA claims is increasingly known, this shift away from litigation should
be carefully considered.
Drafters of arbitration agreements will always try to draft to their advan-
tage, because these agreements are NOT voluntary, the consumer has no
choice.1 3 Indeed, companies try to minimize the cost of actual payment by
using arbitration." 4 Some arbitration agreements also regulate both substantive
issues and procedural issues; i.e. the statue of limitations, what claims may be
brought, the right to relief, or even the burdens of persuasion." 5 As some
108. Id. at 175-77.
109. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 446 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
110. Thompson v. Ill. Title Loans, Inc., 2000 \VL 45493, at I1 (N.D. 111. 2000); Sagal v.
First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F Supp.2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999); Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co, 1996
WL 210073, at *1 (N.D. I1. 1996).
111. Sagal v. First USA Bank. N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (D. Del. 1999)(stating the
plaintiff has the burden to show that Congress intended to make an exception to the FAA).
The Court's preference for arbitration is unquestionable; it has allowed arbitration of anti-
trust claims for an international business transaction and for securities fraud claims. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.. 473 U.S. 614. 665 (1985); Shearsono/Am. Ex-
press v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
112. See infra note 117.
113. Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking The Supreme Courts Pref.
erence For Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 680-82 (1996) [hereinafter Stemlight.
Panacea].
114. Erik Molter et al., PRivATE Dispumr RasoumoN IN THE BAtKucG ,,nusmv 7-8, 11
(1993) (citing a Rand Institute for Civil Justice survey of five banks wherein all the banks admit-
ted they had instituted arbitration to decrease the likelihood of large jury awards). Indeed, sub-
stantially fewer consumers filed complaints after the adoption of mandatary arbitration. Id. at 21-
21.
115. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (concerning the statute of limitations);
15
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companies are want to do with forum selection clauses, the company chooses
a distant forum to discourage claims. 116 The Supreme Court has even upheld
an agreement that prohibited punitive damages."17 It is shameless to suggest
that all companies that use binding arbitration clauses are unfair; the protocol
of the AAA suggests that all clauses should be detailed enough to disclose
material rights, use clear and plain language, and be fair."8 Presumably, com-
panies try to emulate these goals. However, one person humorously decrying
mandatory arbitration clauses hypothesized; "if the provisions are so wonder-
ful, why are the clauses always hidden?"" 9
The reduced discovery often found in arbitration affects the integrity of
the system. Discovery is often limited in arbitration proceedings to speed up
the process and thus decrease costs. 20 This can be problematic because con-
sumers cannot delve into the depths of corporate records to establish a pattern
of harm.'2' It is blatantly unfair where one party has substantially greater ac-
cess to relevant witnesses and evidence, thus they may be denied the opportu-
nity to prevail in arbitration.'2 This also seems to be in direct conflict with
the Court's recognition that adequate discovery may be essential to comply
with "[b]asic considerations of fairness."' 123
Also, the inadequate discovery may preclude the arbitrator from ade-
quately assessing statutory damages. Statutory damages are determined by
DeGaetano, 1996 WL 44226, at * 5-6 (concerning the type of claim that may be brought); Gra-
ham Oil v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (concerning the types of
damages awarded); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756-58 (1982) (concerning the burden of
persuasion).
116. This works for myriad reasons. Primarily, the cost of transport may be prohibitive. Or
the laws or even language is foreign to the consumer. Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 113, at
637 n. 262.
117. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
118. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and
Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer Lender, 1172 P.L1. CoM. L.
& PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 17 (2000)[hereinafter Kaplinsky & Levin, Anatomy]. It is
worth noting the authors filed an amicus brief on behalf of the American Bankers Association et
al. In Support of Petition for En Banc Consideration, Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178
F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999) as well as the amicus brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States in support of the Petitioners, Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. 79
(2000).
119. Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al (citing Mark Budnitz, a Georgia State Univer-
sity Law professor who is a strong opponent to mandatary arbitration clauses).
120. Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al.
121. Id.
122. Stemlight, Rethinking, supra note 83, at 27; Contra Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (refusing to set aside an arbitration agreement on the ground that
discovery was inadequate).
123. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. I v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986).
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considering "among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the credi-
tor, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected,
and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was inten-
tional." 24 The limited discovery usually found in arbitration severely under-
mines it effectiveness.
V. IMPACTS ON CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions' 25 are praised for being efficient'26 and providing improved
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (paragraph following (a)(4)) (emphasis added).
125. Class actions, a permissive procedure, are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. This rule lists the requirements of a class, the basic fact scenarios, and the
procedure for certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
There are four basic requirements for a class, which are numerosity, commonality, typicality.
and adequate representation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). To meet the numerosity requiremcnt, a class
must have enough members that joinder of all members through traditional methods is impracti-
cal. FED. R Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Generally, a class that has more than fifty members meets the
numerosity requirement. Komick v. Talley, 86 F.R.D. 714 (N.D. Ga 1980). There is a split in ju-
risdictions in certifying classes with more than thirty and less than fifty members. Swanson v.
Am. Indust, 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). Although, some courts have certified a class with as
few as twenty members. Ark. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Ed., 446 F/2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971). The num-
ber of members is not the only critical element to numemsity; other relevant factors are the con-
centration of the class members and the magnitude of the claims. Swanson v. Am. Indust., 415
F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
Commonality requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the entire class.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2). Courts take two methods when approaching a question of commonality.
Is there a common nucleus of operative facts. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968). Or
are there liability issues common to the class, and will this common issue predominate over indi-
vidual issues. Steiner v. Equimark Corp., 96 F.R.D. 603 (,V.D. Pa. 1983).
Often viewed as somewhat duplicative of the commonality requirement in (a)(2), typicality
asks if the claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); Scott v. Univ. of Delaware, 601 F2d 76 (3d Cir.
1978). Courts construe this requirement as the class representative must have claims substantially
similar to claims of the entire class. Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45 (ND. II1. 1983).
The final requirement of a class is that there is adequate representation by the class repre-
sentative and the attomeys. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Specifically, the class representative cannot
have any claims antagonistic to the class, and the attorney must be qualified and exercise a vig-
orous representation. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). However, courts will only disavow a
class on this requirement if there is a genuine legal conflict relative to the litigation. Marshall v.
Holiday Magic, Inc.. 550 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
There are three basic fact scenarios where class action applies. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). First is
where separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would
17
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access to litigation,' 2 but recent class actions have been criticized because it
"serve[s] the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys more than" the plaintiffs. 128
Companies often use binding arbitration as a way to minimize the impacts of
litigation and especially class actions. 29 In fact, the National Arbitration Fo-
rum encourages companies to adopt arbitration clauses specifically to avoid
class actions; 130 potential defendants know the plaintiff will not pursue the
claim individually because it is not economically viable.' 3'
A. How TILA Works. With Class Actions
TILA claims dre uniquely suited for class actions for a variety of rea-
sons. The violation is built into documents that are sent to many consumers
all over the country, which easily meets the numerosity requirements. 32 As
for commonality, members will be alleging the same TILA violation, the only
unique factor is the member's actual damages. Again, typicality is not an is-
sue because the representative is alleging the same TILA violation as the
class. Because the class representative has the same claims as the class, there
is no legal conflict between the representative and the class. Jurisdiction is
not a problem as it is in many class actions because TILA is a federal law
and the courts have original jurisdiction. 133
Even with this clear application, there was great debate whether TLA
litigation could support a class action. Defendants and some courts argued the
establish incompatible standards of conduct. FED. R. Ov. P. 23(b)(1). Second is where a class is
seeking injunctive or equitable remedy such as in enforcement of civil rights legislation. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Third is where common questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over individual claim. FED. . Cv. P. 23(b)(3).
As for procedure, the court determines "as soon as practicable" if this can be brought as a
class action. At this point, the court evaluated the above requirements and decides if the action
may proceed. Fm. R. Qv. P. 23.
126. Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U.L. REv. 514, 514 (1996).
127. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617-18.
128. Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 60, at 34, nn 123-126.
129. Kaplinsky & Levin, Predator, supra note 83, at 25.
130. Mayer, Hidden, supra note 72, at Al.
131. Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 60, at 9. Sternlight quotes Attorney Edward Wood
Dunham bluntly describing his strategy; "absent unusual circumstances, . . . the franchisor with
an arbitration clause should be able to require each franchisee in the potential class to pursue in-
dividual claims in a separate arbitration. Since many (and perhaps most) of the putative class
members may never do that, and because arbitrators typically do not issue runaway awards, strict
enforcement of an arbitration clause should enable the frinchisor to dramatically reduce its aggre-
gate exposure." Id at 10.
132. Id. at § 8.8.1, 498.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, jurisdiction is often problematic when federal jurisdic-
tion is based on diversity. RENuART & Kaasr, supra note 16, at § 8.8.2.2, 501.
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$100 minimum civil penalty plus attorney's fees would be an "annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class.'"' To answer
this and following cases, 135 Congress amended TILA to eliminate recovery of
statutory minimums in class actions.136 Statutory damages have an overall
ceiling of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the creditor, whichever
is lower.'3 A class may also recover actual damages.133 Even after this shift
in policy, some courts refuse to certify a class when the basis of the TILA vi-
olation is a technicality, even though the technical violation would support a
TILA claim. 139
B. The Procedure of Arbitration and Class Actions
The class representative must file the case in federal court and wait for
the defendant to demand arbitration at which point the court must decide
whether to enforce individual arbitration, a judicial class action, or classwide
arbitration.140 One way corporations impede class actions is by demanding a
arbitration of the claim of any plaintiff who sought to be a class representa-
134. Ratner v. Cherm. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (argu-
ing holding the company liable for $13 million for a technical violation of TILA on a point that
Regulation Z was initially silent would create a Frankensteinian monster).
135. Ratner v. Chem Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Shields v.
Valley Nat'l Bank 56 F.R.D. 448 (Ariz. 1971) (holding "la]t a time when large business firms in
general appear to be a scapegoat for a great many of our Nation's problems, the Court should not
gratuitously add the final straw.... [A TILA class action] could be the means of curing an ill-
ness by killing the patient ...."); Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 FRD 417 (N.D. GA 1972);
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D.C. Kan. 1972); Keaney v. Landis Fin. Group, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 ( ND. Ga.
1971).
136. One caveat, Congress only intended to allow class actions, not express a preference
for this type of litigation. Agostine v. Sidcom Corp, 69 FR.D. 437, 444 (E-D. Pa. 1975); Fitz-
gerald v. Northeastern Hosp. of Philadelphia, 418 F. Supp. 1041 (ED. Pa. 1975).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B). Interestingly this effectively limits the class to 5.000
members because once the class exceeds this number, each member will receive less than in an
individual action.
138. Ransom v. S & S Food Ct'., Inc., 700 F.2d 670, 677 (11th Cir. 1983). Contra McCoy
v. Salem Mortgage Co., 74 F.R.D. 8, 10 (ED. Mich. 1976)(rejecting proposed formula for actual
damages for all class members).
139. Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1984). Cf War-
kins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1980).
140. Rom, supra note 57. at § 15.8, 10.
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tive, thus preventing the representative from serving. 14'
For certification, there are two options, the arbitrator or the court. 42 Ar-
bitrator certification is generally to be discouraged because the FAA does not
provide for adequate discovery to determine commonality nor may the arbi-
trator be able to adequately protect the Due Process rights of absent class
members raised in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts143 as wells as confuse ap-
pealability issues.'" An arbitrator has the discretion to certify a class, al-
though expect an argument from the service provider that it should have the
agreement enforced on its terms. 45 Whether a matter may be pursued by class
action affects damages allowed, so a clause that does not enumerate the right
to proceed with a class destroys a remedy.'"
C. Can Class Actions be Combined With Arbitration
Recall; however, that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
permissive, thus consumers have no statutory right to bring a class action. 47
The potential for class action litigation in TILA litigation is considerably less
when in arbitration because as of 1998 one federal court of appeals and these
federal district courts have considered whether it may certify a class for an
141. Id. at § 15.1, 2.
142. Id. at § 15.9, 10.
143. 472 U.S. 797 (1985)(holding if the forum state wishes to bind absent plaintiffs con-
cerning a claim for monetary damages, the state must provide minimum procedural due process
protections).
144. Rom, supra note 57, at § 15.9, 11. Specifically, is the order certifying the class im-
mediately appealable as it is in federal courts or must the parties wait until a resolution of the
arbitration? Roth provides an interesting conundrum as follows: "In general, under Section 16 of
the FAA [9 U.S.C. § 16] which was added in 1988, orders denying arbitration are immediately
appealable, whereas orders favoring arbitration are not. Such orders may also involve the rejec-
tion or approval of a classwide arbitration .... A court might deny a petition or motion to com-
pel classwide arbitration but order arbitration on an individual basis, or it might order classwide
arbitration. In such cases, Section 16 does not provide a clear answer. For example, in an order
denying a petition to compel classwide arbitration while ordering an individual arbitration to pro-
ceed appealable under 9 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)(l)(B) and (C) or is it nonappealable under 9 U.S.C. §§
16(b)(2) or (3)?" Only one court has ruled on this issue and found the order unable to be ap-
pealed because it was an "embedded proceeding." Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 951 F.2d
780 (7th Cir. 1992).
145. Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 393 (Ct. App. 1998). The arbitrator
granted the consumer's motion for class certification. let Once granted, Green Tree sought a pre-
liminary injunction in federal District Court, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. Id. The state appellate court held the arbitration agreement should be enforced on its
terms. Id.
146. Sterlight, Rethinking, supra note 83, at 680.
147. Kaminski v. Shawmut Credit Union, 416 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Mass. 1976); 15 U.S.C. §
1641(a).
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arbitration proceeding. 4 All four courts held that certifying a class would fall
outside of the scope of the arbitration agreement 4 9 Accordingly, unless the
arbitration agreement expressly allows a class, the court may not consider
certification. 50
The court in Champ v. Siegel Trading Company did certify a class but
later vacated that motion because of the negative treatment of even consolida-
tion in four federal Circuit courts.' 5' The Sagal court also found no "congres-
sional command" to ignore the FAA and certify a TILA class.'12 Another ap-
pellate court; however, denied a motion to compel arbitration of claims under
TILA because the inability to obtain class-wide relief "seems contrary to the
underlying purpose of TILA."' 53 California has a system wherein the court
can certify a class binding all members to the arbitration.'5'
148. Kaplinsky & Levin, Predator, supra note 83, at 24.26. Arbitration effectively climi-
nates the ability to participate in a class action.
149. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co.. 828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding
that the court did not have the authority to certify a class when there was no such provision in
the arbitration clause); McCarthy v. Providential Corp.,122 F.3d 1242 (1997)(N.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding the court had no authority to overrule the order of the court below compelling arbitra-
tion until the arbitration was complete); Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp.. 991 F. Supp.
1410 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (arguing the same), overruled by 531 U.S. 79 (2001)(holding that a con-
tractual provision to arbitrate a TILA claim is enforceable regardless if it causes plaintiffs to be
precluded from using class actions); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. Inc.. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that absent a provision allowing for class treatment. there is no basis for certify-
ing a class).
150. Id.
151. Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1992). It is worth noting that the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) adopted Rule 12(d) which exempts claims
that can be pursued by a class action from arbitration.
152. Sagal v. First USA Bank, 69 F.Supp.2d 627 (D.Del. 1999)(relying on Champ v. Siegel
Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, which held "where an enforceable arbitration clause allows only for
individual arbitration, a class will not be certified").
153. Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D. Del. 1999); See also In re
Knepp, 229 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that when arbitration effectively eliminates the
ability to participate in a class action, the agreement is prejudicial).
But see Dimick v. First USA Bank, No. 99-2550 (D. NJ. 2000) (holding the FAA neither
conflicts nor frustrates the policies of TILA); Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans. Inc.. no 99 C
3952 (N.D. IIl. 2000) (holding "TILA neither requires class actions nor grants substantive rights
to them."); In re Piper Funds, 71 F.3d 298, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding a party's "contrac-
tual and statutory right to arbitrate may not be sacrificed on the altar of efficient class action
management").
154. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. App. 1982). But see, Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA has valid arbitration provision and states have
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There is of course the similarity between certification and consolidation
to consider. The First and Second Circuits have held that the court may order
consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings. 55 The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits hold that arbitration proceedings may be consolidated
only if the arbitration clause in dispute expressly allows for it.
While judicial intervention may be necessary for class certification, the
hybrid classwide arbitration is compatible with the FAA because it "advances
the goals of arbitration-speed, economy, finality, and the liberal enforcement
of arbitration agreements."'' 57 It seemed classwide arbitration would get a
boost with Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, but in 1992 the
rule barring arbitral class action was unanimously adopted by the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration. 58
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of this shift is being monitored. Jim Michaels, the
Managing Counsel of the Division of Consumer Affairs for the FRB, said the
agency is keeping a close watch on all consumer credit agreements to make
sure "consumers are not being deprived of their rights."' 159 The Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice has started a "Mandatory Arbitration Abuse Prevention
Project" while also recognizing that mandatory arbitration can be "quite use-
ful." 6' Indeed; however, Congress created Truth in Lending Laws to protect
the consumer, and we must make sure that our current policies are still meet-
ing our original goals.
no power to require a judicial forum).
155. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert denied 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). Compania Espanola Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A.,
527 F.2d 966 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert denied 426 U.S. 936 (1976). Both cases relied on Rule 81
(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides "these rules apply ... to the ex-
tent that matters of procedure are not provided for in ... [the FAA]" and Rule 42 which allows
consolidation of actions involving common questions.
156. Del E. Webb Const. v. Richardson Hops. Authority, 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987);
Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western
Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984); Protective Life Insurance Corp., v. Lincoln Na-
tional Life Insurance Corp., 873 F.2d 281 (lth Cir. 1989). These courts all held that Section 4
of the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements "according to their terms."
157. Daniel R. Waltcher, Classwide Arbitration and lob-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 Comat. L. REv. 38, 403 (1989) Stipanowich, Arbitra-
tion and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REv. 473, at
509 (1987).
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